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João Freire 
Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), Portugal  
 
 
The Military and Political Intervention: Ideological Trends and Contemporary Contexts* 
 
This article analyses the evolving relations between the military and political power in Portugal, 
from the time of the 19th century liberal monarchy until the end of the 20th century. In particular, 
it offers an interpretation of the impact of the diffusion of constitutionalist, republican, nationalist 
and socialist ideologies on military culture, and the norms guiding the attitudes and actions of 
military elites within the political arena. It takes into account their professional experience of war 
(the African campaigns, the First World War and the colonial war of 1961-74) and the observed 
behaviour of the working classes recruited for these missions, in the context of the policies 
adopted by successive governments and political regimes. The international context is also 
considered, both with regard to dominant ideologies and established strategic interests.  
 
Keywords: The military; political power; military culture; armed interventions. 
 
Introduction 
Caƌƌilho s͛ ǁoƌk of ϭϵϴϱ amply demonstrated that the evolution of the social composition of 
the officer corps had a bearing on their relationship with the Portuguese context in specific 
eras (1910, 1926 and 1974). However, the same cannot be said of the prevailing political 
ideologies in each of these periods, despite the important contribution by Ferreira (1992). 
This is, therefore, the aim of this text: to attempt to examine the main outlines of the way in 
which, at the dawn of the 20th century, Republicanism affected the officer corps trained 
under the constitutional monarchy; how, a few years later, a new movement based on 
authoritarian and anti-liberal ideas was able to mobilise a large portion of the military cadres 
to ďƌiŶg aďout a ͞ƌetuƌŶ to oƌdeƌ͟; and how, after the experience of a prolonged war in the 
overseas territories, which was low intensity but employed subversive methods, the next 
generation of professional soldiers used their arms to bring down the ruling regime and 
many of them were tempted by various forms of allegiance to revolutionary socialist 
projects. This exercise will obviously involve skimming over Matos s͛ (2008) arguments about, 
and exhaustive examination of, the relations between military institutions and political 
power throughout history, in order to present a few personal reflections, some of which have 
already appeared iŶ puďlished ǁoƌks oŶ the suďjeĐt of ͞politiĐal iŶflueŶĐes oŶ the aƌŵǇ͟ iŶ 
the modern and contemporary world. To a certain extent, this represents the exact opposite 
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of the phenomena analysed by Matos, ǁhose ĐoŶĐeƌŶ is ǁith the ͞iŶflueŶĐe of the aƌŵǇ oŶ 
politics.͟  However, the background also includes general reference works on the relations 
between the army, civil society and the state (Huntington, 1957), the sociology of war 
(Bouthoul, 1970; Keegan, 1976) and the imperial designs of the great powers (Kennedy, 
1987).  
What follows is an interpretative historical and political overview of the social attitudes of 
professional soldiers during the 20th century, which should help formulate consistent 
hypotheses for the motives that led them, on occasion, to intervene directly (or attempt to 
do so) in the political arena thƌough Đoups d͛Ġtat, with the intention of altering the course of 
the government or the nature of the ruling regime. Although this overview refers concretely 
to the case of Portugal, it is not entirely specific to this country and its main lines of analysis 
correspond to general trends observable in other scenarios in the same periods, hence the 
inclusion of some comparative observations relating to situations in other countries (see, for 
instance, Girardet, 1964, for the case of France). It also refers, in general terms, to soldiers, 
but the intention is essentially to restrict this term to the body of professionals who choose a 
career in the armed forces and are the main repositories of military values and culture, 
historical memory and traditions. Additionally, they are the main reserve for the authority 
and intelligence that organise all operational units and that provide the rationale for the 
aĐtioŶs uŶdeƌtakeŶ ďǇ the ŶatioŶ s͛ aƌŵed foƌĐes. In other words, the main reference point 
here is the officer corps (those with fundamental responsibilities for commanding troops and 
the corresponding prerogatives), rather than the sergeants and ordinary soldiers, despite the 
fact that these subordinate ranks exist in much larger numbers. The text refers primarily to 
the army, as the larger and more influential branch of the armed forces, leaving slightly to 
one side aspects which are different and specific to the navy – the subject of a study by 
Freire (2003) – and the air force (still awaiting in-depth studies from a social sciences and 
humanities perspective, in Portugal at least), in order to focus on what they essentially share 
with their comrades in the ground forces: the military spirit.  
In effect, the current idea of the armed forces as an integrated structure with three 
branches that essentially ensures national defence is relatively recent in origin, dating from 
the Second World War and the beginning of U.S. dominance. Before this, they were referred 
to as ͞laŶd aŶd sea͟ foƌĐes, supeƌǀised foƌ a loŶg tiŵe, at the level of government structure, 
by the War and Navy Ministries, respectively. It should, however, be noted that even in a 
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country with an overseas empire such as the one that Portugal possessed in the first half of 
the 19th century, the institutional framework for the defence of Portuguese sovereignty in 
such faraway places was never entirely satisfactorily resolved, bearing in mind the means of 
communication at the time. However, the location of the various theatres of operations and, 
without doubt, also the influences of the most powerful endogenous interests generally led 
to associating the aƌŵǇ ǁith the eǆteƌŶal aĐtioŶs of the state ;͞ǁaƌ͟ aŶd diploŵaĐǇͿ, ǁhilst 
͞ŶaǀǇ aŶd oǀeƌseas affaiƌs͟ were managed jointly (Barata & Teixeira, 2003; Telo, 1999).  
 
Nineteenth-century constitutionalism and the end of the monarchy  
The experience of the civil war fought between the supporters of D. Pedro and D. Miguel – in 
the turbulent times following the French invasions, the withdrawal of the court to Brazil, the 
presence of the English and the first episodes in the Liberal revolution – must have been 
traumatic for many and, to a great extent, determined the profound reorganisation of the 
state which took place in the 1830s. From that time until almost the end of the 19th century, 
continental Portugal was no longer under threat and the armed forces were only used 
occasionally to repress domestic reactions to unpopular measures which were part of the 
plans to modernize the country ;the Patuleia, oƌ ͞little Điǀil ǁaƌ,͟  aŶd peasaŶt uprisings) and 
to settle differences between opposing factions or figures from the dominant political elite 
(Cabralism, the Marechais, etc.). Essentially, these were cases of resistance on the part of the 
socio-cultural survivors of the Old Regime, faĐed ǁith the aƌƌiǀal of ͞pƌogƌess͟ ;ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ 
the free press to the railways) and the emergence of a bourgeois civilization in which wealth 
no longer depended exclusively on birth and the church was no longer (almost entirely) 
indistinguishable from the state. It should be noted that, with an essentially urban concept of 
the police dispersed on the streets dealing with vagrancy, soldiers were still responsible to a 
large extent for maintaining law and order in the territory, a duty which they exercised 
elegantly clad in breeches, short jacket and shako with plumes. 
In these circumstances, the armed forces were experiencing the difficult transition from 
the former principle of personal loyalty to the monarch – to which may be added the near 
monopoly of the court aristocracy over the senior command, as Monteiro (2007) has clearly 
shown, despite recourse to foreign commanders and soldiers, paid at the going rate – and 
the new requirement of loyalty and service to the nation (Valente, 1997; Marques, 1999). As 
the nation was an abstract concept (although materialised in the form of territory and 
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heritage, the population and shared language, in addition to religion), there was a need to 
make use of a combination of institutions to represent it and to find and define, tant bien 
que mal, a place on which the dependence and subordination of the military corps to 
decisions could be anchored: the ministry, the constitution, the king, parliament or the 
courts of law.  
In addition, during this period the main organisational and functional pillars of the 
modern military institution were reformed and consolidated, involving:   Training for the officer corps in specialist schools and the organisation of their 
professional careers on a functional and meritocratic basis;  The codification of the principles of discipline, pay and the rights and duties of 
military status (for example, ending corporal punishment but, on the other hand, 
enshrining the swearing of allegiance to the flag and the obligation to serve the 
ĐouŶtƌǇ ͞eǀeŶ at the saĐƌifiĐe of oŶe͛s oǁŶ life͟Ϳ;  The organisation of compulsory military service for all able-bodied men; 
 The importation of new weapons and equipment for troops (weapons with spiral 
barrels and breech loading, steamships, etc.).  
In general, in these decades the idea that the military as an institution was a basic 
component of nationality itself, serving its people and respecting their history, was forged 
more consistently. In other words, the ideological basis of military nationalism (which may 
also translate into the idea of patriotism and is distinct from other forms of nationalism) was 
founded. It may be noted, as an aside, that this veritable mythology corresponded to the 
values extolled by the political class representing Liberal constitutionalism, but owed little to 
real history since, strictly speaking, it was only after the late 17th century that reference could 
be made to a national army (i.e. a single army subordinate to the head of state, although 
raised in the provinces by municipalities and the nobility). However, it helped to construct 
the prestige of an institution which, through some of its most distinguished members 
(engineers, astronomers, geographers, etc.), was also involved in the economic and social 
development of the country following the civil war.  
After the Berlin Conference of 1885, and given the urgent need for effective occupation of 
the overseas territories dictated by the course of history, Portuguese soldiers were called 
upoŶ to fight ͞oŶ the fƌoŶtieƌs,͟  in particular in Africa, in a series of operations and 
campaigns that were generally very successful (despite numerous setbacks), and which came 
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to profoundly affect the political attitudes of the army. Despatched to exotic and distant 
lands, with precarious and difficult logistical bases and lines of communication, the army and 
navy officers (often marching across land or supporting these manoeuvres with rudimentary 
naval resources) were able to hone their skills (in commanding men) and qualities (decision-
ŵakiŶg, ƌesouƌĐefulŶess aŶd daƌiŶgͿ to take ŵaǆiŵuŵ adǀaŶtage of the ͞huŵaŶ Đapital͟ 
entrusted to them, particularly the unselfishness, humility, obedience and spirit of sacrifice 
of the ordinary fighting man (Freire, 2009 and 2010).  
At the same time, the most outstanding members of this elite quickly discovered 
unsuspected vocations as public administrators (in the new colonial administration installed 
in the territory after conquering the tribes and indigenous peoples) and various others were 
moved by scientific curiosity to explore and acquire detailed knowledge of the territories, 
their resources and populations. The official reports from the military campaigns and colonial 
government of the time were full of curious information about local history and culture, as 
well as references to prospects foƌ the eĐoŶoŵiĐ deǀelopŵeŶt of ͞futuƌe Bƌazils.͟  At the 
same time, they took note of the incipient urban life in the small towns and cities where 
whites, natives and foreigners laboured, the random allegiances or submission of the 
indigenous authorities to the Portuguese flag (with the payment of the respective tax on 
huts), the violent incidents and acts that took place here and there, and the establishment of 
͞outposts͟ ;iŶitiallǇ ŵilitaƌǇ aŶd lateƌ adŵiŶistƌatiǀeͿ to ĐoŶtƌol vast territories, which were 
gƌaduallǇ liŶked ďǇ telegƌaph liŶes aŶd ƌoads opeŶed afteƌ ƌeƋuisitioŶiŶg ͞laďouƌeƌs͟ ;alďeit 
paidͿ, ŵaŶaged ďǇ the Poƌtuguese. Fƌoŵ these ͞feǁ ďƌilliaŶt aŶd Đonsoling pages in the 
histoƌǇ of ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ Poƌtugal͟ ;as MouziŶho de álďuƋueƌƋue ǁƌote1), these men took 
the material needed to reinforce the model of the military hero, entirely and exclusively 
dedicated to serving his country, who was content simply to know he had done his duty and 
to receive some form of symbolic recognition from the country, such as decorations, tributes 
to the dead or, best of all, a place amongst the great names of Portugal.  
The hesitatioŶs of these ŵeŶ fƌoŵ the ͞sĐhool of MouziŶho͟ – the history of Paiva 
Couceiro, mordantly characterized by Valente (2006), is a case in point – in the face of the 
subtleties and traps of state politics meant that the dizzying developments that took place at 
the beginning of the 20th century – such as the working-class socialist movement, the 
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 In a letter to His Royal Highness Prince Luís Filipe in 1901, reproduced in Nunes (2003). 
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women s͛ suffƌage ŵoǀeŵeŶt or the aesthetic revolution in music or painting – passed this 
generation by, since they were powerless to control them and incapable of understanding 
them. However, the African experience had a profound effect on the memory of the 
geŶeƌatioŶs that folloǁed aŶd aƌŵed theŵ ǁith a ǀisĐeƌal distƌust of ͞the sǁiŶe, politiĐs͟ ;to 
quote Bordallo).  
Moreover, during this period the process of social sealing of the officer corps, with 
descendants following the same vocation and reinforced family connections, was 
consolidated, meaning that authentic military lineages were created. If the aristocratic 
elitism of the officer class gradually disappeared, the entry of the best sons of the middle 
class and petty bourgeoisie (and more rarely the working class) into this group compensated 
for this with the advantages offered by a more substantial technical training (Carrilho, 1985).  
 
The spread of Republicanism  
The rapid and even overwhelming way in which, within around twenty years, Republicanism 
spread in Portugal amongst a significant portion of the urban bourgeoisie and acquired 
enthusiastic supporters amongst the Lisbon intellectuals, many shopkeepers and artisans and 
even the ͞hoi polloi͟ iŶ working-class neighbourhoods and in the barracks is perhaps still 
surprising. The best-known and most consistent historiography has long ago identified the 
causes, described how it took place and discussed the consequences (Marques, 1977; 
Wheeler, 1978; Ramos, 1994). An example of the latter was the fact that, as it began later, it 
occupied the ground where working-class socialism was already developing, thus blocking 
the development of a central European type of social democracy and facilitating the course 
of the revolutionary syndicalist alternative. But it may be considered that the success of the 
‘epuďliĐaŶ ideologǇ aŶd politiĐal ŵoǀeŵeŶt had a lot to do ǁith the degƌee of ͞ƌotteŶŶess͟ 
of the monarchy as an institution – that is to say, its inability to respond to the cultural 
challenges of the age, an area in which, in addition to the political class, the substantial 
influence of the Catholic church, still closely linked to power, weighed heavily – and, on a 
deeper level, with the intensification of the demagogic populist wave that had already swept 
through the country in 1820 (Valente, 1974; Cabral, 1979).  
What is certain is that the Republican idea also won over many soldiers after the 
iŶsuƌƌeĐtioŶ of ϭϴϵϭ ;ǁhiĐh has ďeeŶ Đalled the ͞sargentada͟ [seƌgeaŶts͛ ƌevolt]), and also 
seeped through to the officer ranks, with motive and method. The motive was again 
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constructed around the idea of nationalism, now understood as the opposite of ͞faŵilǇ 
iŶtƌigues aŶd ŶegotiatioŶs͟ iŶheƌeŶt to the ŵoŶaƌĐhǇ, ƌefusiŶg to alloǁ Portuguese interests 
to be undermined by those of the English and importing supposedly scientific grounds 
(positivism) to legitimise its ambitions to the extent of accepting a federalist view of the 
state, as Fernandes discusses in detail (2008). The method was that of Carbonari conspiracy, 
whose roots dated far back in time but continued to prove effective in bringing down a 
ƌegiŵe ͞ǁhiĐh ŵaŶǇ seƌǀed ďut feǁ suppoƌted,͟  as was the case in Portugal. The result, for 
the military as an institution, was as follows: ͚Torre e Espada͛ military honours bestowed on 
the heroes of the African occupation and an increase in the number of aides-de-camp in the 
royal military household were not sufficient to keep the army loyal to the government,2 and 
the ͞‘epuďliĐaŶ ǀiƌus͟ iŶ the ďaƌƌaĐks Đaused a dual iŶteƌŶal ďƌeakdoǁŶ, due to politiĐal ;aŶd 
soon party) divisions introduced into its midst and to the habit of summoning armed troops 
to enforce any cause or objective supposedly beneficial to the country.  
The ͞fatheƌs of the ‘epuďliĐ͟ aŶd ŵaŶǇ of its ideologues ǁeƌe iŶtelligeŶt, eduĐated, 
altruistic and (as far as we know) honest men who quickly understood the risks that 
politicised troops posed to the stability and credibility of the new regime. Participation in the 
First World War (see Teixeira, 1996) – involving approximately 50,000 members of the 
expeditionary forces, but apparently with reservations on the part of certain cadres 
concerning combat in the European theatre – with the main political objectives of 
guaranteeing possession of the colonies and making Portugal a partner recognized by the 
great European powers (in particular England, France and Spain), also came to serve the 
purpose of reunifying the armed forces and giving them a new sense of mission. The 
sacrifices made by thousands of career and non-career officers, sergeants and ordinary 
soldiers had, in fact, the psychological effect of creating a sense of ͞uŶitǇ͟ aŶd ͞ďeiŶg 
ŵisuŶdeƌstood ďǇ otheƌs͟ that are acknowledged to exist in most ex-combatants. Although 
the Republic had profusely honoured the efforts and heroism of these soldiers, thus 
reinforcing their patriotism, this did not redeem its original sin of partisanship and intrigue. 
Moreover, the everyday use of firearms meant that certain conscripts felt more ready to use 
them for their own purposes once they returned from the snow-covered fields of Flanders or 
the dry African steppes. Thus, the level of violence in society increased and armed soldiers 
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 See, for example, its composition in the Lista Annual de Antiguidades dos Officiaes da Arŵada[…] referida a 
31 de Dezembro de 1902. Lisbon, IN, 1903. 
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continued to intervene in politics, in plots generallǇ diƌeĐted agaiŶst the ͞diĐtatoƌship of the 
deŵoĐƌatiĐ ŵajoƌitǇ͟ ;the paƌtǇ led ďǇ áfoŶso CostaͿ, ǁhiĐh ǁas iŶ ƌealitǇ the legal 
government (appointed by paƌliaŵeŶtͿ, oƌ as a ƌespoŶse to ƌestoƌiŶg the ͞ĐoŶstitutioŶal 
normalcy of 1911.͟   
After Sidonism, an anti-Liberal political grouping began to take shape, in which many 
soldiers, marked by the experience of war (and its economic consequences) and discontent 
ǁith the ͞scum͟ leadiŶg the Đountry, were involved. Corporative questions (such as the 
integration of non-career officers into the permanent corps or more arms for the National 
Republican Guard [GNR]) and the deterioration of political and social life – with unstable 
government, a budget deficit, disorder in the streets and financial scandals – together with 
the profound changes taking place all over Europe (the USSR, Germany in crisis, Italian 
fascism, the rule of the military dictatorship in Spain, etc.), led to the emergence of 
nationalist movements (the Nuno Álvares League, etc.) and later to pre-seditious military 
juŶtas aŶd, fiŶallǇ, to the ƌeǀolutioŶ that ǁas to ͞put the ĐouŶtƌǇ iŶ oƌdeƌ͟ aŶd bring about 
peace. Once again, nationalist values and references were brought into focus, attaching all 
the ďlaŵe to the ͞BeƌŶaƌdiŶos MaĐhados,͟  as the political pamphlet written by the young 
lieutenant Humberto Delgado and entitled Da Pulhice do Homo Sapiens [On the 
Despicableness of Homo Sapiens] so clearly illustrates.3  
Whereas Republican nationalism established itself against the ͞ĐollusioŶ of Đouƌt aŶd 
clergy,͟  New State (Estado Novo) nationalism was built on the rejection of both demagogic 
politics and social disorder.  
 
Salazar’s civil peace  
One of the strongest arguments that led the majority of the soldiers to give their long-lasting 
support to the New State was the rejection of political interference in the barracks and the 
reconquering of a sense of cohesion and unity that could only reinforce the military spirit.4 In 
fact, in addition to the involvement of uniformed personnel in a wide variety of coups and 
conspiracies, it was the military leaders who, for one reason or another, were involved (and 
involved the troops) in the main acts of force directed against serving governments, some of 
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 Published in 1931, passionately supporting the dictatorship (on the same subject, see also the book by 
Frederico Delgado Rosa, 2008). 
4
 As an example from amongst many existing memoirs, see the book by General A. Ilharco (1926). 
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which represented the most bloody civil struggles of the 20th century in Portugal. Firstly, 
there were the 1911 and 1912 incursions from Galicia and the monarchist uprisings in Porto 
and Lisbon in January 1919 led by Paiva Couceiro, the insurrection of 14 March 1915 
oƌgaŶised ďǇ the ͞deŵoĐƌats͟ to ďƌiŶg doǁŶ the ͞diĐtatoƌial͟ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt of GeŶeƌal 
Pimenta de Castro, the military movement of 5 December 1917 led by Major Sidónio Pais 
(shot one year later by a member of the Republican Party), the aborted conspiracy of General 
Sinel de Cordes of 18 April 1925 and the applauded ͞ŶatioŶal ƌeǀolutioŶ͟ iŶstigated ďǇ 
General Gomes da Costa on 28 May 1926 – not forgetting the confused and bloody night of 
19 October 1921. Following this, there were the ferocious Republican and popular uprisings 
of ϯ aŶd ϳ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϭϵϮϳ, the ͞Castle upƌisiŶg͟ of Ϯϴ JulǇ ϭϵϮϴ, the ͞‘epuďliĐ of Madeiƌa͟ iŶ 
April 1931 and the military movement of 26 August 1932, all opposing the government of 
the dictatorship and well analysed by Farinha (1998). In these various cases, armed civilians 
almost always played a part (non-mercenary volunteers, it should be noted) fighting 
alongside the military units in revolt, which conveys the impression of how normal violence 
was during this period (to which the bombers and civilian militias added in their own way5). 
Far more serious, however, was the responsibility of these insurrectionary officers, since they 
were seriously violating their duties as the armed wing of the nation (to defend it against 
attacks from abroad) and illegitimately forcing their subordinates to support their beliefs.  
In addition, since political participation was a Republican right that did not exclude 
soldiers, countless army and navy officers joined the ranks of the governments of the 1st 
Republic, the parliament at S. Bento and the lists of party members, inevitably adding to the 
divisioŶs aŶd ǀeƌďal Đlashes ͞aŵoŶg comrades.͟  The support base of the New State 
contained a combination of very diverse elements and political sensibilities. The National 
Union party itself was seen by many as a nonpartisan demonstration of support for a regime 
aŶd a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt that ǁaŶted to do ͞eǀeƌǇthiŶg foƌ the ŶatioŶ.͟  It should not be forgotten 
that parliamentary democracy was heavily contested in the 1920s and 30s, both by populist 
and nationalist movements (in Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, etc.) and by the 
opposing alternatives represented by Communism and the USSR. It was therefore not 
surprising that some of the soldiers who assumed political duties in the New State did so to 
oppose the sterile partisanship and parliamentarianism of the 1st Republic, and that others 
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 See, for example, the PhD dissertation in History by Filipa Freitas (2007). 
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accepted posts in the state administration because they believed they were working for 
national resurgence.  
Thus, “alazaƌ s͛ pƌogƌaŵŵe to ͞ƌetuƌŶ the soldieƌs to the ďaƌƌaĐks͟ aŶd ͞paĐifǇ the 
ĐouŶtƌǇ͟ iŶĐluded the folloǁiŶg ŵeasuƌes:   A drastic reduction in the level of violence and lack of safety in society, using the 
necessary means; 
 The estaďlishŵeŶt of a desigŶated ͞eŶeŵǇ ǁithiŶ,͟  firstly in the figure of the 
revolutionary working-class movement (which was defeated in the uprising of 18 
January 1934) and later the Communist party (which served this purpose up to the 
end);  
 The ͞soft͟ puƌgiŶg of the less tƌustǁoƌthǇ ŵilitaƌǇ leadeƌs, as Faƌia ;ϮϬϬϬͿ aŶd Matos 
(1999) have clearly shown;   Plans to modernize war equipment, through the Magalhães Corrêa naval programme, 
spares from the Second World War, the creation of an air force, and NATO equipment 
(Telo, 1996);  The appointment of senior officers to top prestigious state positions (Presidents of 
the Republic, military ministries, order of protocol, etc.); 
 The adoption of measures of (indirect) economic support and social privilege for the 
͞ŵilitaƌǇ faŵilǇ,͟  making it more cohesive and isolating it a little more from the 
national collective (whilst maintaining the structural segmentation of the military 
hierarchy);   Developing the essential vocation of the armed forces by identifying successive 
external threats looming over the integrity and independence of the country; while 
some of these were real, others were inflated for political reasons, but they always 
gave the soldiers the sense of their indisputable necessity and usefulness (the Spanish 
Civil War, the Second World War, the Cold War, India and, finally, the war in Africa, 
which ͞ǁas iŶstigated agaiŶst us fƌoŵ the outside͟ aŶd Đould oŶlǇ haƌŵ deǀelopŵeŶt 
in the overseas territories).  
When the generation that had played a part in the establishment of the Republic and the 
First World War disappeared, serious political dissent in the military in fact ended, and the 
rare incidences of dissent or mere court conspiracies became minor phenomena without 
relevance or impact on the morale of the troops. The next generation, who served under the 
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New State, ignored politics, in the best and worst sense, but this had a positive and 
considerable effect on cohesion, the professionalization of the cadres and the general 
efficiency of the armed forces, although it made them a crucial support base for the regime 
of Salazar – who was himself decorated with the ͚Torre e Espada͛ by the military high 
command in May 1932.6  
In this way – through the heritage of the 19th century, the consolidation of the institution 
itself, the campaigns and expeditions in distant lands and the experiences of political 
intervention – the ethics and culture of the contemporary Portuguese military was forged.  
The former refers to what should be, the military courts being responsible for its definition 
within the internal or corporative order, while the legitimate political power emanating from 
society is responsible for establishing its mission. The latter refers to what actually is and, 
from this perspective, can be examined and analysed, in particular through academic 
research (Freire, 2009a).  
 
The last of the African campaigns and the 1974 Revolution 
The Poƌtuguese goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ƌeaĐted pƌoŵptlǇ aŶd effiĐieŶtlǇ to the outďƌeak of ͞suďǀeƌsiǀe 
ǁaƌs͟ iŶ áŶgola, GuiŶea aŶd MozaŵďiƋue – and was actually supported in this by the 
democratic opposition. There, soldiers were severely tested, overcoming difficulties of 
various types and leaving in the field proof of their loyalty and honour, with ten thousand 
killed and many maimed out of the approximately one million who were called up (Cann, 
1997). However, the regime was unable to survive these protracted conflicts. The persistence 
of the local nationalist fighters and the (relative) international isolation of Portugal were the 
main exhaustion factors, but the end of the wars, the consequent independence of the 
territories and, above all, the fall of the actual regime in Lisbon only became possible 
because a significant number of lower ranking officers were moved to conspire and carry out 
a suĐĐessful Đoup d͛Ġtat.  
During those years, the professional cadres of the army, navy and air force experienced 
the privations of a war without rules, for which they had not been prepared, in addition to 
the regular dramas involved in this kind of extreme situation. Many read Jean Lartéguy,7 
                                                          
6
 He was the first civilian to receive this honour (Martelo, 1999). 
7
 The novels The Mercenaries, The Centurions and The Praetorians, about the wars in Korea, Indochina and 
Algeria, were published to great success in France in 1960 (the first two titles) and 1961, and soon translated 
into Portuguese and published by Bertrand. 
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questioned their role as the centurions of the West (or the regime) and perhaps became 
disorientated by the ambiguous responses to their doubts. They also came into close contact 
with a Ŷeǁ geŶeƌatioŶ of studeŶts ǁho, as ĐoŶsĐƌipts, ǁeƌe foƌĐed to fight ;oƌ deseƌt …Ϳ, and 
commanded a succession of troops who were the sons of ǁoƌkeƌs aŶd peasaŶts fƌoŵ ͞iŶŶeƌ 
Portugal,͟  for whom they were the main role models – as fighters and as men (Brito, 1999-
2001). Whilst some committed (or allowed) atrocities and adopted other forms of fear-
averting behaviour, they were all able to see and assess the behaviour of the colonialists and 
the authorities and the poverty of African life on the basis of their personal experience and 
intervention. New solidarities were forged between soldiers from different ranks and 
separate branches. Orders from Lisbon or any headquarters, visits by important officials or 
information extracted by force by the PIDE (International and State Defence Police) seemed 
strange and abstruse to them at times. In the meantime, in everyday life, it was common to 
share combat rations with a black youth, light a cigarette in the mouth of a dead soldier or 
make a pious gesture towards an already helpless prisoner.8 Eventually, the large-scale 
ŵoďilisatioŶ of ĐoŶsĐƌipted offiĐeƌs aŶd the ͞ŵisĐegeŶatioŶ͟ of the tƌoops led to a more 
extensive occupation of the territories, and most of the actual fighting was transferred to the 
special forces (some of whom had been recruited locally), given them also the odiousness of 
the task at a time when international opinion had already been won over to the cause of 
independence.  
This was the experience of the men responsible for the Revolution of 25 April 1974 – 
although there were differences with regard to the navy and the air force. Given their basic 
training, they were not unaware that in setting out on this path they were violating the 
fundamental principles of military discipline and their duty to obey the legal government of 
the nation. Yet they believed that they were responding to the deepest aspirations of the 
majority of the Portuguese people and perhaps, to a certain extent, redeeming the armed 
forces from their political intervention at the start of the New State and the strong support 
they had given it for decades. In fact, from the first hours of the uprising and throughout the 
entire process that followed until the national situation was normalised as a constitutional 
and politically free democratic regime, the main objectives of Democratisation, 
                                                          
8
 Novels and memoirs of the colonial war (António Lobo Antunes, Carlos Vale Ferraz, etc.) are perhaps the best 
testimonies of this human experience. 
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Decolonisation and Development were never questioned by significant sectors of the 
population.  
However, the soldiers of the Revolution did not emerge unscathed from opening this 
ǀeƌitaďle PaŶdoƌa͛s Boǆ. PolitiĐs – now warlike and youthful, driven by an important, diverse 
and revolutionary far left (Oliveira, 1993) – quickly entered the barracks, bases and ships, not 
to ͞ƌaise the ĐoŶsĐiousŶess of the ŵasses,͟  but to sow division, capture allies and isolate the 
adversaries of the moment, consequently paralysing the mechanisms of the chain of 
command and neutralising the operations of the units. In addition to the climate of freedom 
previously experienced in 1910, the usual demoralisation that comes at the end of a war that 
has not been won (although not lost either), was now felt in the ranks, increasing the 
prevailing level of indiscipline even more. The MFA (Armed Forces Movement) itself, which 
had momentarily conceived of itself as a Third World-style liberation movement (Oliveira, 
1975) quickly became an arena for the confrontation of different political and military 
opinions (and actions, with loyalties that went beyond the established hierarchies). Factions 
said to ďe fƌoŵ the ƌight ;the ͞“piŶolistas͟Ϳ, the ĐeŶtƌe-left ;the ͞Melo-áŶtuŶistas͟Ϳ, the left 
;the ͞GoŶçalǀistas͟Ϳ aŶd the faƌ left ;the ͞Otelistas͟Ϳ – Ŷot to ŵeŶtioŶ the ͞Kaulzistas͟ aŶd 
other firm defenders of the deposed regime, were all caught up in the situation. To prevent 
bloodshed and fratricide, the important factors, amongst others, were the realism imposed 
by the international context, the timely reaction of Mário Soares, the military intervention of 
͞the ŶiŶe,͟  the intelligence of Álvaro Cunhal in reining in conflict and the moderating and 
mediating role played by some officers, not always visible to the public, aided by the shared 
status of ͞Đoŵƌades iŶ aƌŵs͟ of all ǁho were in disagreement with each other (Rezola, 2006).  
Following the coup of 25 November 1975, the political scenario changed decisively for the 
forces of the movement, fƌoŵ a dǇŶaŵiĐ offeŶsiǀe ǁith the aiŵ of ͞ĐaƌƌǇiŶg the ƌeǀolutioŶ 
foƌǁaƌd͟ to a situatioŶ of ƌesistaŶĐe aŶd defeŶĐe of the ͞ĐoŶƋuests aĐhieǀed.͟  
But what could have led career officers, born and trained under the New State, to display 
such a great propensity for partisan divisions and undisguised sympathy for socialist and 
͞aŶti-iŵpeƌialist͟ ideologies to the point that, when the political regime stabilised from 1976 
onwards, many adopted a ͞ƌeǀolutioŶaƌǇ,͟  distƌustful aŶd ĐƌitiĐal attitude toǁaƌds the 
democratic parties (from the Socialist Party to the right) and allowed themselves to be 
instrumentalized by the Communist sector (in all its shades), displaying a certain degree of 
tolerance towards the far left and even, as happens with all fronts – see the proximity to the 
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so-called Catholic progressives or the role played by Marshal Costa Gomes in the Peace 
Movement of the 1970s and 80s (Rodrigues, 2008) – with conservative figures who accepted 
the score?  
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to briefly recall the way in which, 
throughout the 20th century, the main political movements considered the role of the 
military in the changes they were engaged in bringing about.  
 
Soldiers and politicians  
Let us leave aside fascism and Nazism, which organized their assault on state power through 
counter-revolutionary mass movements. After Jauƌğs aŶd the ͞saĐƌed uŶioŶs͟ of the Fiƌst 
World War, social democrat trends accepted without further question the mission of the 
armed forces in external defence, only expressing a preference for compulsory military 
service and a reticence towards professional armies.9 The orthodox Communist parties, on 
the basis of the historic experience of the civil war in Russia and their terrible struggle 
against the Germans from 1941 to 1945, began to consider the armed forces as a 
fundamental instrument in political action, both at home and abroad, and thought that, like 
the state itself, it should be firmly controlled by the party.10 Thus, with their notorious tactical 
flexibility, they were just as capable of attracting men with an inflexible military spirit (since 
they needed their powers of command and their technical knowledge) as they were of 
persecuting and ordering the execution of those who dared to denounce their thirst for 
control, as happened countless times during the Spanish Civil War11 and the Stalinist internal 
purges. In Portugal during the PREC (Ongoing Revolutionary Process), support for the people-
MFá alliaŶĐe oƌ foƌ ͞Đoŵƌade VasĐo͟12 was the order of the day and was instrumental in 
translating this orientation.  
In turn, the Chinese communists13 had a very different experience in theiƌ ͞loŶg ŵaƌĐh͟ to 
conquer the state (Gluksmann, 1969). They introduced a dual combination of nationalist 
oďjeĐtiǀes ;agaiŶst ŶeighďouƌiŶg iŶǀadeƌs aŶd ͞iŵpeƌialists,͟  the distant exploiters of their 
                                                          
9 See the classic work by Jean Jaurès (1910).  
10
 For technical concepts of assault on power from a Bolshevik perspective, see the 1931 book by A. Neuberg 
(1970). 
11
 Fƌoŵ the ǀast ďiďliogƌaphǇ oŶ this suďjeĐt ;aŶd the ǀioleŶĐe of this ͞iŶteƌioƌ͟ ǁaƌ ǁhiĐh also had a ͞fƌoŶt͟  
aŶd a ͞ƌeaƌguaƌd͟Ϳ, see Freire (2008).  
12
 Coronel Vasco Gonçalves was Prime Minister of Portugal from 18 July 1974 to 19 September 1975. [T.N.] 
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resources) with socialist-Marxist-Leninist objectives for the state control of the economy and 
the dictatorship of the party of the proletariat, on the one hand, and forms of conventional 
warfare with guerrilla warfare, on the other hand. Their ĐoŶĐept of a people͛s aƌŵǇ did Ŷot 
essentially differ from the one invented by the Bolshevists in 1919, and it may be 
summarised thus: the regular troops were deployed in defence and conquest, whilst the rural 
or urban guerrillas provided the offensive, even when disadvantaged by lack of resources, 
and always under the control of the political commissars.14  
This was the model which, in general, was copied by the Latin American guerrillas15 and to 
a great extent in the anti-colonial struggles in Africa, of which Portugal and its former 
overseas provinces had such a bitter experience (Afonso e Gomes, 1998). It can also be 
understood how, in other situations, nationalist soldiers who felt they had received little 
recognition from their political leaders (corrupt monarchies, puppet governments, etc.) and 
who were revolted by the submission of their country to the interests of foreign powers, 
Đould haǀe opted foƌ a ͞ŶatioŶal ƌeǀolutioŶ͟ to take oǀeƌ the ƌeiŶs of poǁeƌ, iŵpose stƌoŶg 
political regimes and engage in external campaigns that were more in keeping with their 
vision of the forces at play. This was what happened successively in Turkey,16 Egypt, Iraq, 
Libya, etc. In countries recently freed from colonialism in Africa (from Algeria to several in 
sub-Saharan Africa), in particular those where guerrilla warfare had taken place, the army 
also played an important role, together with the single party.  
This is a plausible interpretation for the phenomenon of the synchrony between the 
traditional attitudes of the soldiers and the habitual values of the socialist movements (which 
appear to have nothing in common – consider, for example, hierarchy versus egalitarianism 
or obedience versus creativity), from the moment when the latter abandoned their initial 
ideas of internationalism and also began to defend national objectives and principles (as was 
the case with the domestic and foreign policy of the Bolsheviks after 1930), in addition, 
naturally, to the comfort of seeing themselves recognized and close to the state power of 
these new or refounded nations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13
 See Mao Tse-tuŶg͛s On Guerilla Warfare (1937; Portuguese translation from 2004) and also N. V. Giap, 
People͛s War, People͛s Arŵy, originally published in 1961. 
14
 See the works of Trostky collected in Comment la révolution s͛est armée (1967) and L͛ Arŵée Rouge (1969).  
15
 See Ernesto ͚Che͛ Guevara (1971). The Brazilian Carlos Marighela also wrote a Mini-Manual do Guerrilheiro 
Urbano in 1969, the year in which he was killed in action. 
16
 In this case, bringing profound internal changes in terms of the secularisation and modernisation of society. 
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During this process, which lasted for thirty or forty years of the 20th century, 
developments and changes began to take place in the habitual interventions of armies in the 
governance of their countries, which had formerly always been against movements and 
fƌeƋueŶtlǇ agaiŶst ͞CoŵŵuŶisŵ aŶd all otheƌ suďǀeƌsiǀe ideas͟; aŶd had alǁaǇs aĐted to 
impose order and the authority of the state, the unity of the nation and traditional values 
(religious, social or economic). It will suffice to recall the cases of Spain, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Greece, Chile and Argentina. This was a development that some must have taken as an 
encouragement to advance the cause of socialism by means of ͞ŶatioŶal deŵoĐƌatiĐ 
revolutions.͟  Their political strategies came to include infiltration of the military and, when 
circumstances justified it, alliances ǁith the ͞pƌogƌessiǀe seĐtoƌ͟ of the aƌŵǇ to prevent it 
from being controlled by the establishment.  
All this meant that, in the case of Portugal in the 1970s, many professional soldiers felt 
attracted to such left-wing perspectives. Their sense of organisation, authority, methodical 
work, hierarchical decision-making and obedience to leaders was reflected much more in the 
iŶteƌŶal disĐipliŶe of the PC ;CoŵŵuŶist PaƌtǇͿ aŶd its ͞deŵoĐƌatiĐ ĐeŶtƌalisŵ͟ thaŶ iŶ the 
congenital parliamentarianism of the PS (Socialist Party) or the bold maximalism of the far 
left.17 Indeed, soldiers who have been attracted to political intervention have been, in 
general, more likely to form alliances with Communist parties, whose interests they end up 
serving, rather than with any other sector of the political spectrum. Moreover, nationalism 
(generous in some cases and more instrumental in others) can provide an ideological 
platform where they can meet, in addition to the fact that both cling to a unitary and 
centralist concept of power in human communities ;͞PolitiĐs Ŷeeds stƌoŶg diƌeĐtioŶ,͟  the 
Leninists say; ͞Whoeǀeƌ giǀes the oƌdeƌs, ǁe ǁill ĐaƌƌǇ theŵ out,͟  reply the soldiers).  
On the other hand, anarchism never had any penchant or place for the military (except for 
dissenters or deserters), given its internationalist (anti-nationalist), pacifist (anti-war but not 
necessarily non-violent) and anti-militarist (considering military leaders to have an interest in 
and to be responsible for wars) beliefs, in addition to its individualist attitudes (which did not 
exclude the community, but made it very difficult for the discipline of the barracks to be 
accepted) (see Freire, 1988). Likewise, the military were never seduced by this ideology, and 
                                                          
17
 See the writings of Álvaro Cunhal. Whilst there is no particular emphasis on the role of the military in the fall 
of the dictatorship in Rumo à Vitória, in A Revolução Portuguesa: O Passado e o Futuro (1976) the actions of the 
MFA are analysed in some detail. On this subject, see also Maxwell (1995) and Schmitter (1999).  
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only a few isolated cases of defection to pacifism have been recorded, such as Von Müller 
(the commander of the Emden), Tibbets (the pilot of the Enola Gay) or the French general De 
Bolardière (a critic of the Gaullist force de frappe). The ͞ŵilitaƌǇ ƋuestioŶ͟ was only belatedly 
pondered by a small minority of Spanish anarcho-syndicalists – and by the Portuguese Jaime 
Brasil – who suggested ways to make armed defence more compatible with the libertarian 
spirit (organisation of volunteer militias, greater involvement of the lower ranks in 
hierarchical discipline and power, etc.). The story of the ͞aŶaƌĐhist lieuteŶaŶts,͟  transmitted 
orally by the famous Pedro da Silveira,18 refers to a group of young Azoreans who came to 
Coimbra in 1909 or 1910 to begin foundation studies before joining the School of Warfare 
and, caught up in the Coimbra euphoria of the immediate post-monarchist period (of the 
Demagogic Phalanx type or similar groups), became anarchists, at least for a few years, as 
was the case of Aurélio Quintanilha, Jaime Brasil, Hasse Ferreira, Adriano Botelho and even, 
surprisingly enough, Ortins de Bettencourt.19 But this was more of a student hoax than a 
political reality worthy of consideration. In any case, in the Portuguese political process that 
began in 1974 this ideological current showed no desire to intervene in the course of events 
(see Freire, 2007 and 1985). 
Let me offer a final comment on the soldiers of the April revolution. Their generosity and 
loyalty to a certain idea of the Portuguese people cannot be questioned. However, it is 
legitimate to examine their public behaviour and try to understand the deep-rooted reasons 
for it – whether pleasant or not. In this sense, it would seem that, in addition to the more 
obvious causes already identified and generally invoked (war fatigue, etc.), a deeper 
explanation for the developments that took place (from the 1960s onwards) may be found in 
the weakening of the normative value of military nationalism. As already noted, this had 
been laboriously constructed during the 19th century, and was the basis of the heavy 
involvement of the troops with Republicanism and later with the Salazar regime.  
This gradual denationalisation of the attitudinal references of the military developed 
further with the path pursued from 1974 up to the present day. Once again, it has something 
to do with the loss of confidence in the main state leaders (yesterday, the ageing charismatic 
leaders; today, the allegedly corrupt politicians) and a lot to do with the general 
                                                          
18
 Pedro Laureano Mendonça da Silveira (1922-2003). A non-academic scholar, writer and poet born in the 
Azores, he was for many years a senior official at the National Library in Lisbon. 
19
 Who would become Navy Minister under Salazar from 1936 to 1944, and probably the strongest Salazar 
supporter of all (Freire, 2003). 
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cosmopolitanism that has emerged everywhere (with music, cinema, novels, TV, tourism, 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal ŵaƌƌiages, aŶd Ŷoǁ the IŶteƌŶet…Ϳ. It is also liŶked to the ĐhaŶges oďseƌǀed ďǇ 
Janowitz (1971) and Moskos and Wood (1988), which supposedly tended to make them 
closer to efficient professionals, one step away from security specialists and two steps away 
from the old mercenaries.  
The nation was grateful to the soldiers of the April revolution for having put an end to the 
New State regime,20 given that few others would have been able to do so, at least in the way 
that it was done (without great violence or flashing lights), as also happened in the period of 
transition. But this recognition should be extended to the citizens that they also were, rather 
than the soldiers who, once again, had overstepped their duties, albeit this time for a ͞good 
cause.͟  The exceptional nature of this fortunate intervention should have recommended 
greater discretion to them and the quickest possible return to their traditional mission. Was 
it the political conditions of the time that made this difficult? 
áfteƌ the ͞ŶoƌŵalisatioŶ͟ of ϭϵϳϲ, it is peƌfeĐtlǇ uŶdeƌstaŶdaďle that, in the context of the 
Cold War in which Portugal always remained a member of the western alliance against the 
soĐialist ďloĐ, those kŶoǁŶ as the ͞ŵilitaƌǇ left͟ ďegaŶ to ďe seeŶ ďǇ those in charge of the 
armed forces as persona non grata in matters relating to defence secrets and operational and 
senior decision-making posts. Knowing the solidarities that prevailed in this area, they could 
oŶlǇ ďe ĐoŶsideƌed poteŶtial ageŶts of aŶ eŶeŵǇ ͞fifth ĐoluŵŶ͟– despite the feeling of 
injustice that this may have created in some. Yet, this sanitary cordon also met with strong 
internal opposition, both in the corporatiǀisŵ of the ͞Đoŵƌades iŶ aƌŵs,͟  and in the status 
claimed by/attributed to the soldiers of the April revolution.  
It should be added, as a final note, that military nationalism, although weakened, is still 
present today, above all implicitly, thanks to the diffuse anti-Americanism within public 
opinion, combined internally with a proto-unionist activism as a reaction to the loss of status 
of the military in society and in the eyes of the state. Society has imposed substantial cultural 
changes, including women in the army, multiculturalism, equality, associations, etc. (Carrilho, 
1998; Matos e Bacalhau, 2001; Carreiras, 2002), whilst the state appears not to have yet 
                                                          
20
 The beginning of the Preamble to the Constitution approved in 1976 and still in force today praises them 
thus: ͞OŶ Ϯϱ ápƌil ϭϵϳϰ, the áƌŵed FoƌĐes MoǀeŵeŶt, settiŶg the seal oŶ the Poƌtuguese people's loŶg 
resistance and interpreting its deep-seated feelings, overthrew the fascist regime. The liberation of Portugal 
from dictatorship, oppression and colonialism represented a revolutionary change and a historic new beginning 
iŶ Poƌtuguese soĐietǇ.͟  
RCCS Annual Review, 2, October 2010                                                                                                                   The Military and Political Intervention 
114 
clearly defined the mission that should now be attributed to the armed forces, wavering 
between concepts of defence and security and the links between national (Portuguese) and 
regional/global spaces (Rodrigues, 2004; Nogueira, 2005; Nogueira e Borges, 2006).  
25 April 1974 was certainly a historic moment for contemporary Portugal. But having so 
decisively opened the door to the future, did the ͞ŵeŶ ǁho Ŷeǀeƌ slept͟ imagine the future 
that awaited the armed forces? 
Translated by Sheena Caldwell 
Revised by Teresa Tavares 
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